On March 4, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Travel Promotion Act of 2010 (TPA), which established a public-private corporation to promote travel to the United States. Results from a survey of twenty financial analysts who follow the hospitality industry reveal that twelve of them considered TPA when analyzing hotel firms' value at the time the law was signed. Two others had already revised their value assessment in 2009 when they first heard that the act was being considered. These analysts all believed that TPA would have a positive impact on firms in the hotel industry. Consistent with the analysts' expectations, abnormal stock market returns indicate that publicly traded hotel firm stock prices increased by approximately 1.93 percent, on average, at the time of the TPA signing. Results of cross-sectional analyses of the abnormal stock returns indicate that hotel firms with a larger proportion of rooms in the upper chain-scale tier benefited more from TPA, and real estate investment trusts (REITs) would experience greater gains from TPA than C corps. Finally, we find that firms with a substantial portion of their rooms outside North America gained no more, nor less, than other hotel firms did from the TPA.
Signed into law by President Obama on March 4, 2010, the Travel Promotion Act of 2010 (TPA) received considerable attention from both supporters and detractors. Proponents believed that it would encourage international travel to the United States and improve lodging firms' revenues, after two years of recession (India-West 2010; Stutz 2010; Volpe 2010) . However, opponents viewed the TPA as another instance of government overreach. As a result, Ernst and Young analysts predicted that TPA would be one of the top three issues confronting the hotel industry in 2011 (Fishbin 2011) .
The TPA created the Travel Promotion Board, a quasigovernment agency that was tasked with advertising and promoting academic and business travel to the United States. Public statements supporting TPA are abundant. For example, West Virginia Senator Jay Rockefeller argued, "Increased tourism [because of TPA] would boost the hospitality industry, increase the number of individuals eating in American restaurants, encourage additional spending in retail stores, and expand the use of all forms of transportation" (Congressional Documents 2010) . The Tribune Business News stated that TPA would create 12,000 jobs in Nevada alone (Stutz 2010) . Roger Dow, president and CEO of the U.S. Travel Association concluded, "The need for travel promotion has never been greater . . . the Travel Promotion Act is a win-win for our economic and diplomatic efforts" (Anderson 2009 , page 1). However, South Carolina's Senator Jim DeMint argued against TPA for two reasons. One, he asserted that government is less efficient at most activities, including advertising and promotion, when compared with private corporate endeavors. Two, little additional benefit would accrue from TPA activities because large corporations already devote significant resources to effective promotional campaigns (Congressional Record 2009 . In a similar tone, it was suggested in the Wall Street Journal (2010) that TPA is a part of a liberal agenda that adds little value to an industry that can fend for itself.
With that controversy, it is worth examining how stock analysts reacted to the passage of the TPA, based on their revisions of expected stock performance. Two studies in 2009 estimated the prospective costs and benefits of TPA by projecting growth in travel demand. In one study, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (Congressional Budget Office 2009, pages 4-6) estimated that additional increased travel fees and tax revenues associated with increased tourism would reduce the federal deficit by $425 million over ten years. In the other, Oxford Economics, a business consulting and forecasting company, estimated that a successful national promotion would yield $4 billion in new spending annually, create 40,000 new jobs, and generate $321 million in new tax revenue each year (Freeman 2012; ) .
Our study provides results from two related analyses that assess the importance of TPA to the hotel industry by looking at stock values, rather than revenues or room-nights. We first provide survey evidence about the relative importance of government regulation and TPA, as assessed by financial analysts who conduct lodging equity research and make recommendations to potential investors. We find that these analysts expected the TPA to have a positive impact on hotel firms' value. We then examine whether the analysts' expectations were realized, as evidenced by positive stock market reactions to events associated with the passage of TPA.
Although the structure of the hotel industry is diverse, consistent with our focus on how U.S. equity analysts and U.S. equity markets assess the impact of TPA, we examine publicly traded U.S.-based hotel real estate investment trusts (REITs) and publicly traded U.S. C corps in Standard Industrial Code (SIC) 7011, which is the code that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission assigns to hotels and motels. The publicly traded firms in our study manage or own 38 percent of the hotel rooms in the United States (see Exhibit 7).
We conduct an event study in which we examine press announcements and the Congressional Record to identify informational events that provided investors with valuerelevant information about the content of the TPA and the likelihood of its passage. We then use the capital asset pricing model to determine whether the TPA caused abnormal returns for hospitality firms. We calculate the normal returns for firms over the relevant informational event period, which is the time of the TPA's authorization, and then define abnormal returns as the actual returns minus the normal returns predicted by the model. The abnormal returns measure the overall change in the market value of hotel firms as a result of TPA's adoption. We also conduct cross-sectional analyses of the abnormal returns to determine how the wealth effects of TPA vary with individual firm characteristics.
Our two-pronged approach provides evidence of the TPA's potential effects on the industry. The analyst survey provides an assessment of the relative importance of TPA compared with other value determining factors in the marketplace. The market analysis provides investors' assessments of the TPA's expected net benefits. Our analysis also gives evidence on whether investors expected REITs and C Corps to benefit equally from the TPA. Finally, cross-sectional variation in the impact of TPA on firms in the hotel industry provides a potential explanation for controversy that surrounds TPA.
The TPA
The TPA established the Corporation for Travel Promotion, a nonprofit entity that is now known as Brand USA, to promote leisure, business, and scholarly travel to the United States, as well as to communicate U.S. government policies and requirements for travel to the United States by citizens of other countries. The TPA authorizes the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Department of Homeland Security, to appoint the corporation's board of directors, review and approve the corporation's annual objectives, and transmit its annual report to Congress. The eleven travel promotion board members are overseen by the Commerce Department.
As explained on the TPA website, initial funding for the corporation came from the collection by the Department of Homeland Security of a $10 travel promotion fee assessed on travelers from the forty-eight so-called visa-waiver roadmap countries.
1 These are the thirty-eight countries with which the United States has a visa-waiver agreement and ten other countries that have applied to become visa-waiver countries. Funding would also come from a program of private-sector contributions that would match up to $100 million of the travel promotion fees. In Year 1, the corporation's budget was to be no more than $10 million of the travel promotion fees collected in the first year. In Year 2, the budget increased to no more than $100 million, with a 50-percent match by industry. Eighty percent of the industry match could be in-kind, but 20 percent must be in cash. In Years 3, 4, and 5, the budget was set at $100 million, with a 100-percent industry match. In Year 6 (2015) and beyond funding of the corporation would be by industry assessment only. The TPA fee assessment sunset in 2014. (The U.S. House of Representatives passed a reauthorization and revision bill in 2014, but the bill did not pass in the U.S. Senate.) The way the law stands at this writing, private-sector companies and other organizations that benefit from increases in international travel will be asked to make voluntary contributions. However, the legislation provides a mechanism by which members of the industry can vote to create a more formal means of collecting private-sector contributions. In the event that members of the industry choose to explore this avenue, no industry assessment can be enacted without a majority of the members voting in favor of it (ITA, Office of Travel and Tourism Industries 2009).
After we discuss the results of a survey of financial analysts about the perceived impact of government regulation and TPA on the valuation of hotel firms, we review the event study literature and the regulatory events associated with the passage of the TPA, as well as the likely impact of each of the events on the law's passage. We explain the research design and methodology for our event study, and discuss the types of hotel firm expected to receive the greatest benefit from TPA, followed by an analysis of the actual effects of the law.
Survey of Hotel Equity Research Firms
In 2013, we sent a short e-mail survey to equity analysts at leading research firms that follow publicly traded gaming and lodging companies, asking them to rate the relative importance of various general environment factors expected to influence the performance and equity values of hotel firms (Olsen, Tse, and West 2008) . Among other questions, the survey asked about the analysts' familiarity with the TPA and whether they considered its likely effects when analyzing the hotel stocks in their portfolio of companies (Exhibit 1). Olsen et al.'s five general factors are economic, socio-cultural, technological, political-regulatory, and ecological (see Exhibit 1). Several authors have used these factors in analyses of the impact of general industry conditions on earnings and firm value (see, for example, Bridoux and Stoelhorst 2014; Goyal 2013; Kim and Kim 1992; Memdani 2013) .
Twenty hotel analysts from twenty equity research firms completed our survey, as shown in Exhibit 2. As we discuss in the following section, the analysts ranked economic factors as most important, followed by political-regulatory factors, socio-cultural factors, and technology and innovation factors. Environmental factors were considered to be the least important of the five critical factors.
As a government-sponsored initiative, the TPA can be placed into the political-regulatory category. But if the TPA is successful, it will be because of the response of international consumers to the promotions sponsored by the government, and that response will be influenced by both socio-cultural and economic factors. As government promotion of travel under the TPA fits into the three categories perceived as most important by analysts, we expect that analysts will consider the TPA to be important when evaluating financial performance and valuing firms in the hotel industry.
As shown in Exhibit 4, our prediction is partly correct. Consistent with the implications of Exhibit 3, twelve of the twenty analysts considered the impact of the TPA when assessing performance and firm value. Exhibit 5 summarizes analysts' beliefs about the likely impact of TPA on the equity values of hotel firms. Each of the dozen analysts who considered TPA to be important also thought that the impact of TPA would be positive, consistent with favorable early press coverage of the act. Although no analyst follows all twenty-three stocks on our list, their collective judgment shows that the TPA would benefit the industry.
Exhibit 6 shows that analysts learned about the TPA in 2010, which is primarily when changes occurred in the market valuation of the hotel firms. Richard Santiago, former director of Global Insights and Innovation for Brand USA, concurred that the buzz on the street around the TPA occurred in 2010.
In summary, a majority of the analysts we contacted think that the TPA has had a positive impact on firms in the hotel industry and incorporated their expectations about the TPA into their analyses beginning in 2010. Next, we conduct an event study analysis to determine whether the analysts' perceptions were accurate. We also examine the magnitude of the TPA's impact, as well as the characteristics of firms expected by the market to benefit the most from the passage of the TPA. Olsen, Tse, and West (2008) . Note. GNP = gross national product.
Hospitality Event Studies
The usefulness of event study methodology is well established, examining such topics as the wealth effects of initial public offerings in the hospitality industry (Canina 1996) , acquisitions in the lodging industry (Canina 2001; Ma, Zhang, and Chowdry 2011) , and the impact of terrorism on hospitality stocks (Chang and Zeng 2011) . Although we found no published papers that have used event study methodology to examine the impact of legislation on hospitality firm value, we did discover numerous examples of event studies that have examined the effects of regulation on other industries. 2 We develop four hypotheses about the economic impact of the TPA on hotel firms. To test the hypotheses, we measure changes in the value of the firms' equity. We also identify firm-specific factors that help to explain the size of a given firm's stock return effects relative to those experienced by other firms in the industry.
Individual Events and the Effect of Regulatory Change
Although the analysts responding to our survey (and commentators) expected benefits for the industry from the TPA, they were uncertain about the magnitude of those benefits. Moreover, we must address the stance that the industry would not benefit from a government-supported program on the grounds that private corporations are better at advertising and promotion than a quasi-government agency would be. This line of reasoning suggests that corporations are better served through direct corporate expenditures rather than through a government-created third party. Our study can test those notions by relating the effect on hotel stock prices when the TPA was authorized.
A major difficulty associated with measuring the stock return effects of regulation is the selection of the appropriate informational events. We need to know specifically at what times and in what form the market receives information useful to the forming of expectations about future firm values. Given that all but two of the analysts we surveyed were unaware of the TPA until 2010, we searched for informational events that occurred in 2010. We concluded that the most significant informational event in 2010 was when President Obama signed the law. Admittedly, testing only the signing of the TPA will provide a conservative measure of its impact on the industry, and we will not know specifically what effect the law had in the following four years. Reinforcing our expectation of a conservative result is the fact that only two of our survey respondents knew about TPA in 2009. One of the earliest stories about the TPA 
Hypotheses
With that background, our first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The signing of the TPA into law by President Obama is associated with a positive impact on lodging firm stock performance.
Cross-Sectional Determinants of Market Reaction
We also develop three hypotheses about how the impact of the TPA on a given firm will vary with the firm's competitive situation. The first competitive factor is whether the firm is a REIT or a C corp. Howton et al. (2012) provides evidence that REITs and C corps have different cost structures and that REITs have greater potential growth. Thus, we predict Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, REITs will gain more from passage of TPA than C corps.
The second competitive factor that is expected to influence the magnitude of the impact of TPA on hotel firms' performance is the proportion of a hotel firm's assets in upper tier chain-scale segments, as defined by Smith Travel Research (www.strglobal.com/resources/glossary/en-gb). These are hotel firms with a relatively larger proportion of their hotels in luxury, upper upscale, or upscale segments. To capture a firm's position in upper tier chain-scale segments, we use the common industry measure, revenue per available room (RevPAR). Furthermore, because Ismail, Dalbor, and Mills (2002) indicate that the relationship between a hotel firm's financial return and news events is nonlinear with respect to RevPAR, we use the square of RevPAR to account for this nonlinearity. Thus, a higher square of RevPAR may be associated with a greater impact from the TPA's adoption.
In this regard, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, firms with higher revenue per room will benefit more from the passage of TPA.
The third competitive factor is the degree to which the firm does business in North America. Proponents of the TPA believed that the act would lead to an increase in international travel to the United States, as well as some substitution to the United States from destinations elsewhere in the world. We extend this argument to all of North America, as some travelers may visit Mexico or Canada once they travel to the United States. Thus, one possible view is that firms with a larger proportion of hotel rooms in North America, relative to the rest of the world may benefit more from adoption of the TPA. A second possible view is that the fact that a firm has more rooms outside North America may make it more salient for international travelers to visit that firm's North America accommodations. Of these two effects, we do not know which is likely to be dominant.
Thus, a third possibility is that either there is no effect relating to rooms outside North America or the two effects exist but would roughly cancel each other out. To sort this out, we predict that having more than 10 percent of a firm's rooms outside North America will have a nonzero effect on value, and we test to see whether the variable's coefficient is equal to zero. The results of the cross-sectional analysis are discussed below.
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, firms with more than 10 percent of their rooms outside North America will benefit either more or less from the passage of the TPA compared with firms without many rooms outside North America.
Event Study Research Design
As we indicated above, our initial sample consisted of all of the U.S.-based publicly traded C corps in SIC code 7011 and all REITs holding hotel assets for which the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) stock price data were available during the study period-a total of twenty-five firms. We had to drop two of the firms due to significant confounding events during the event testing period. We dropped Interstate Hotels and Resorts because it agreed to merge with two other hotel firms by the end of the first quarter of 2010 (PR Newswire 2009). We eliminated the second firm, Lodgian Inc., because it was taken private in April 2010 (PR Newswire 2010) . This left us with a sample size of twenty-three hotel firms for event testing, eleven REITs and twelve C corps.
As we stated at the outset, these twenty-three firms represent approximately 38 percent of hotel rooms in the United States and more than 90 percent of total market capitalization of public lodging firms (Compustat data 2009). Furthermore, these firms represent all of the major global hotel brands with geographic representation in the primary travel destinations in the United States, including all the gateway cities (see Exhibit 7). If the TPA has any effect at all on hotels' cash flows, these firms feel that impact. Among the data shown in Exhibit 7 is the number of rooms per firm at year end 2009, which is information that would have been available to market analysts at the time of the signing of the TPA.
Test of Market Reaction
The first hypothesis is tested by examining the overall industry market reaction to authorization of the TPA, as determined by measuring daily abnormal returns of the event period. To control for the effects of marketwide fluctuations, the market model is used to measure expected returns: Following the conventions of previous studies (e.g., Hughes, Magat, and Ricks, 1986; Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; Johnson, Niles, and Suydam 1998) and the findings of Brown and Warner (1980, 242-43; Brown and Warner 1985, 12; Binder and Summer 1985, 173) , an equalweighted market index is used as a proxy for the market rate of return. The parameters α i and β i were estimated for the event by using 255 trading days of daily return data. Generally speaking, in event studies, we want the parameters of the model to be estimated over a short time period before the event occurs. This involves a trade-off. The closer the estimation period is to the event period, the less likely it is that sample firm betas have changed due to changes in leverage, management strategy, and firm investments. But estimation data from a period too close to the event period may be contaminated by abnormal returns that were caused during previous regulatory announcements or proceedings. To avoid the likelihood of confounding information, we estimate the parameters of the model using 255 days of data prior to, 2009. We started before 2009 because of the two analysts who knew about TPA in 2009 and because the article by Anderson makes it apparent that discussion of TPA was occurring in trade publications in 2009.
Once the parameters α i and β i have been estimated for each firm, the daily prediction errors (abnormal returns) for firm i were calculated as follows:
where AR it is the abnormal return for firm i on day t. We examine abnormal returns for the three-day window that includes the event day and the trading day immediately before and after the event. Inclusion of the trading day prior to the event controls for information leakage that may occur if some market participants are privy to discussions among policymakers prior to public announcement of policy actions. Inclusion of the trading day after the event accounts for late arrival of information to the market or adjustment to information that requires time for market participants to interpret. A window that is too large will include extraneous information. A window that is too small may not fully capture the effects of information leakage or slow market adjustment. Our relatively brief three-day window means that our results are conservative and may underestimate the impact of TPA. The three-day cumulative abnormal returns for each firm were computed as below:
where, CAR i is the cumulative abnormal return for firm I, AR it is the abnormal return for firm i on day t, and t = 0 is the day the TPA was signed by President Obama.
To determine the average overall impact of the event on the industry, we calculate the three-day cumulative average abnormal return for the sample cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) by summing across the twenty-three firms in the sample and then dividing by that number as follows:
where, CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return across all twenty-three firms in the sample and CAR i is the three-day cumulative return for firm i around the event.
To examine whether each informational event had a significant average return effect on the industry, we conduct a test using a z statistic of the null hypothesis that the three-day cumulative average abnormal return across firms equals zero.
Cross-Sectional Analysis
Cross-sectional analysis uses multiple regression to test the remaining hypotheses that differences in abnormal returns across firms are explained by underlying differences in the firms' competitive positions, including the three firm characteristics outlined below that are predicted to explain some of the variation across firms.
The first explanatory variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is a REIT and zero if it is a C corp. Based on the work of Howton et al., we expect different results for REITs and C corps due to their substantial diversity. First, REITs are on average more upscale and more likely than C corps to own properties that are full-service providers. Second, REITs have, in the past, performed better than C corps in terms of operating profit margin, occupancy, and growth. Third, REITs often have lower insurance costs due to their bargaining power with insurers. Finally, some C corps earn revenue from gaming and food sales, in addition to their room divisions.
The second independent explanatory variable is the firm's RevPAR squared, drawn from the annual reports of the twenty-three firms for the fiscal year ending 2009, which would have been the most recent data available to investors when President Obama signed the TPA.
In addition to measuring a hotel's profitability, RevPAR indicates the hotel's chain-scale. Ismail et al. argue that most investors and analysts in the hotel industry use RevPAR to determine firm value. Results of the analysis by Ismail and his colleagues show that luxury hotels have greater RevPAR elasticities than budget hotels, so that high-end hotels' RevPAR changes more than does that of lower scale firms in response to economic changes. As shown in Exhibit 8, Ismail et al. estimated elasticity for luxury firms at about 1.24, as compared with 0.40 for budget hotels. One way to look at this is that good news is better news for high-end firms than for low-end firms. But then bad news hits the high-end properties much harder than low chain-scale firms. For this reason (and from the research cited above), we expect a nonlinear relationship between RevPAR and stock market reaction to President Obama's signing of the TPA. That is, if the TPA is good news, the percentage increase in RevPAR for high-end firms should be much greater than that for low-end firms. In addition, the abnormal returns should be higher for the high-end firms than for lower end firms.
The third independent explanatory variable is one we label Dout, which refers to the percentage of rooms a hotel company owns that are outside North America. Dout equals one if more than 10 percent of the firm's hotel rooms are outside of North America and zero otherwise. The argument here is that more rooms a firm has outside North America, the fewer rooms that can benefit from TPA. Moreover, the fact that a firm has a substantial number of rooms outside North America may make booking that firm's accommodations more salient for international travelers (reducing the effect of TPA). The number of rooms was obtained from the annual reports of the twenty-three firms for the fiscal year ending 2009 in the same way that RevPAR was collected.
We estimate the following multiple regression model for all available observations in the sample:
where, CAR i is the three-day cumulative return for firm i, REIT i is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is a REIT and zero if the firm is a C corp, Sqrevpar i is the square of revenue per room for the firm, Dout i is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has more than 10 percent of its rooms outside North America and zero otherwise, and γ 0 , γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 , are the estimated intercept and three slope coefficients.
To review, our first hypothesis predicts that the estimated coefficient on REIT, γ 1 , will be positive; our second hypothesis predicts that the estimated coefficient on Sqrevpar, γ 2 , will be positive; our third hypothesis predicts that the estimated coefficient on Dout, γ 3 , will be nonzero.
Results of Event Testing
As shown in Exhibit 9, our analysis shows that hotel firms enjoyed increased stock returns when the TPA was signed, supporting H1. Note. CAAR = cumulative average abnormal return; TPA = Travel Promotion Act; REIT = real estate investment trust. a. CAAR is the average abnormal return for the twenty-three firms over the three-day event window, day before day of and day after the signing by President Obama. Abnormal returns are calculated using an equalweighted market index. b. Number of the firms had positive returns over the three-day event window relative to the number of firms with negative. c. This is the z statistic that tests the Hypothesis that the 3-Day CAAR=0. The CAAR of 1.93% is significant at the 1.78% level of confidence.
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where, as before, CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return for the sample of twenty-three firms and CAR i is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i over the event window.
The CAAR for the signing of the TPA is 1.93 percent, at a level of significance of .0178 for the z statistic. This positive abnormal return is the average for all publicly traded REITs and C corps in our sample. Again, as we are testing just one informational event in a long legislative process, we believe that this 1.93-percent estimate is a conservative measure of the legislation's benefit for the industry.
Results of Cross-Sectional Analysis
Exhibit 10 provides a summary of descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in the cross-sectional analysis. Panel A presents the mean, maximum, and minimum values for the independent variables. Mean REIT is .4783, reflecting that eleven of the twenty-three firms in the sample are REITs. There is significant variation in the square of RevPAR, Sqrevpar, which ranges from a low of 872.6116 (RevPAR = 29.54) to a high of 24,025 (RevPAR = 155). The presence of low-tier and high-tier firms in our sample allows us to investigate the hypothesis that high-tier firms benefit more from increases in international travel in response to TPA.
Panel B of Exhibit 10 shows that REIT and Sqrevpar have almost no correlation in our sample. This coincides with the fact that our sample of REITs and our sample of C corps include both high-and low-RevPAR firms. Dout is slightly negatively correlated with both Sqrevpar and REIT. Therefore, our regression is unlikely to have multicollinearity problems.
Exhibit 11 shows the results of our cross-sectional regression. First, we find that REIT firms' stock values gained more from the passage of the TPA than did those of C corps, supporting Hypothesis 2. This result is significant at the 1.4-percent level. This result fits well with the idea that REITs have a different cost structure than C corps.
While we see that the regression indicates that higher chain-scale firms, as measured by Sqrevpar, benefit more from TPA than lower chain-scale firms, we must temper this conclusion because the coefficient is significant only at the 10-percent level. This gives us only modest evidence to support the idea that higher chain-scale firms benefit more from TPA than lower chain-scale firms.
Finally, we do not find evidence to support our third hypothesis, because the p value for γ 3 is .495. This indicates that firms with more than 10 percent of their assets outside of North America were neither better nor worse off than other firms during the three days of the TPA event. This may be a result of two possible cases. The first case is that both increased revenue exposure and easier access by international travelers occurs for firms with significant assets outside North America. If this is the case, the two effects offset each other so that the total effect is approximately equal to zero. The second case is that neither effect is significantly different from zero. In either case, we conclude that, with regard to the TPA, there is no significant advantage or disadvantage to having a significant number of rooms outside North America.
Summary and Conclusion
We estimate that the simple signing of the TPA improved the hotel industry's equity value by about 2 percent. This cumulative average abnormal return represents approximately a $1 billion increase in the value of publicly traded hotel firms. Although the entire industry saw higher equity values, REITs benefited more from the TPA than did C corps, and firms with higher RevPAR (presumably highend properties) also benefited more from the TPA signing than did other firms. The message for managers from our results is that the industry did, in fact, benefit from the signing of the TPA, particularly REITs and high chain-scale hotels. We must leave it to a subsequent study to determine whether the optimism shown by the analysts and the stock market was justified. Given the promising start when the TPA was signed, it may make sense for hotel firms to increase their investment in Brand USA to take full advantage of the opportunities brought forth by the TPA. In that regard, further analysis of the TPA should provide an indication of whether the act continued to benefit the industry after its initial boost. 
